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CASES NOTED
again. 20 Here, divestiture was found to be necessary, rather than to intrust an
already monopolistic industry with the management of a competitive bidding
system or burden the court with its detailed and extensive supervision.
2'
The success of the Government in the recent maze of anti-trust actions
gives rise to a belief, that the next decade will witness a tremendous growth
of this type of litigation.2 2 The Paramount cases should and will form an im-
portant basis for future actions against allied industries such as radio, tele-
vision, professional athletics, and other entertainment fields. These industries
are inherently monopolistic because they are based on the development of
individual talent to a point at which it becomes irreplaceable. Should divestiture
prove successful as a remedy against the motion picture industry there may
be a more extensive use of this remedy in dealing with other anti-trust viola-
tions in the entertainment industries.
PROCEDURE-COUNTERCLAIM COMPULSORY IN REPRESENTATIVE
SUIT ALTHOUGH CLAIM AGAINST PLAINTIFF REPRESENTATIVE
IS PERSONAL IN NATURE
Plaintiff, employer of the deceased, brought a wrongful death action
against the defendant as assignee of the decedent's widow. The action was
brought in a representative capacity under the Florida Workmen's Compen-
sation Act which permits a widow to assign her right of action for her
husband's wrongful death.' From a judgment for the plaintiff, the defendant,
who had failed to counterclaim in the initial suit, brought a separate action
against the employer as such for damages. The employer's motion to dismiss
was sustained on the ground that the issues had been fully adjudicated in
the former action. On appeal from the order dismissing the action, held;
order affirined, since the Florida statute2 requires the defendant to file
counterclaim in the original action for any damages sustained from the
same transaction. Newton v. Mitchell, 42 So.2d 53 (Florida 1949).
The defendant, upon appeal, contended that the statute requiring one to
counterclaim for damages arising out of the occurrence sued upon in the
initial suit should only apply to defeat his action had he subsequently sued
the plaintiff in the latter capacity as the assignee of the widow's right, that
20. United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173 (1944).
21. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 163 (1948) ; United
States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 881, 895 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
22. The baseball industry has already been attacked by private individuals for vio-
lations of the anti-trust laws. Martin v. Chandler, 85 F. Supp. 131 (S.D.N.Y. 1949);
Gardella v. Chandler, 79 F. Supp. 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). It is not inconceivable that
the government may also take some interest in the competitive conditions in that
industry.
1. FLA. STAT. § 440.39 (1941).
2. FLA. STAT. § 52.11 (1941).
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
is in the same capacity in which the plaintiff had sued him. Since the sub-
sequent suit was brought against the plaintiff in his capacity as employer
for the negligence of his employee, a different capacity from that in which
the plaintiff had brought the initial suit, the statute should not apply. While
recognizing this distinction in capacities, the court took the view -that the
employer was in court, in the initial suit, in a dual capacity as (1) assiglee
of the widow's right, a representative capacity, and (2) as employer of the
deceased. A fortiori, had the defendant validly counterclained, a verdict could
have been entered against the plaintiff and it would have been no defense to the
plaintiff that he was bringing the action in a representative capacity. The
court had previously distinguished the representative capacity from the per-
sonal capacity and had held that the element of mutuality of parties was
essential to a counterclaim.3 Thus when the husband had sued as representa-
tive of his wife and defendant counterclaimed against the husband personally,
counterclaim was not allowed as the essential element of mutuality was
lacking. 4 Demands, to be subject of a counterclaim, must be "'mutual" which
means that claims must be due to and from the same parties acting in the
same capacity. 6 The term "counterclaim" implies a reciprocal demand existing
between the same persons at the same time.6 This view is currently followed
by the federal district courts 7 when applying Federal Rule 13 after which
the Florida statute is patterned.5
13y requiring the filing of a counterclaim in the initial suit the court in
the instant case was influenced by its awareness of the tremendous volume
of litigation growing out of motor vehicle collisions. To have held otherwise
would have increased the burden of the court by permitting circuity of actions.
It is submitted that failure of a defendant to file counterclaim in the initial
action for damages sustained in the same occurrence will constitute a waiver
of that right regardless of the fact that the plaintiff is liable to the defendant
in a different capacity from that in which plaintiff has brought his action.
TAXATION-PUERTO RICAN PARTNERSHIPS PLACED AT
DISADVANTAGE BY ABANDONMENT OF CIVIL
.LAW CONCEPT
Defendant, member of a partnership ("Sociedad") duly forined and
registered in accordance with the Puerto Rican Code of Commerce, was
3. Proodian v. Plymouth Citrus Growers Association, 149 Fla. 507, 6 So.2d 531
(1942).
4. Ibid.
5. Southern Ry. v, Elliott, 86 F.2d 294, 269 (4th Cir. 1936).
6. Tidewater Coal Exchange v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 31 F.2d 446 (D.C.
Del. 1929) ; Sheffield v. Preacher, 175 Ga. 719, 165 S.E. 742 (1932).
7. Dunham v. Bunn, 85 F. Supp. 530 (D.C. Pa. 1949).
8. Symonds v. Browning, 156 Fla. 808, 24 So.2d 526 (1946).
